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The articles during this re-creation of A significant other to Philosophy of legislation and felony Theory were up to date all through, and the addition of ten new articles guarantees that the amount maintains to supply the main up to date assurance of  present pondering in criminal philosophy.

  • Represents the definitive instruction manual of philosophy of legislation and modern felony concept, precious to somebody with an curiosity in felony philosophy
  • Now good points ten completely new articles, overlaying the parts of threat, regulatory idea, technique, overcriminalization, purpose, coercion, unjust enrichment, the guideline of legislation, legislations and society, and Kantian felony philosophy
  • Essays are written through a global workforce of major students

Chapter 1 estate legislations (pages 7–28): Jeremy Waldron
Chapter 2 agreement (pages 29–63): Peter Benson
Chapter three Tort legislation (pages 64–89): Stephen R. Perry
Chapter four felony legislations (pages 90–102): Leo Katz
Chapter five Public overseas legislations (pages 103–118): Philip Bobbitt
Chapter 6 Constitutional legislation and faith (pages 119–131): Perry Dane
Chapter 7 Constitutional legislations and Interpretation (pages 132–144): Philip Bobbitt
Chapter eight Constitutional legislation and privateness (pages 145–159): Anita L. Allen
Chapter nine Constitutional legislation and Equality (pages 160–176): Maimon Schwarzschild
Chapter 10 proof (pages 177–187): John Jackson and Sean Doran
Chapter eleven Interpretation of Statutes (pages 188–196): William N. Eskridge
Chapter 12 clash of legislation (pages 197–208): Perry Dane
Chapter thirteen traditional legislation concept (pages 209–227): Brian Bix
Chapter 14 felony Positivism (pages 228–248): Jules L. Coleman and Brian Leiter
Chapter 15 American criminal Realism (pages 249–266): Brian Leiter
Chapter sixteen severe felony reviews (pages 267–278): Guyora Binder
Chapter 17 Postrealism and felony method (pages 279–289): Neil Duxbury
Chapter 18 Feminist Jurisprudence (pages 290–298): Patricia Smith
Chapter 19 legislations and Economics (pages 299–326): Jon Hanson, Kathleen Hanson and Melissa Hart
Chapter 20 criminal Formalism (pages 327–338): Ernest J. Weinrib
Chapter 21 German felony Philosophy and concept within the 19th and 20th Centuries (pages 339–349): Alexander Somek
Chapter 22 Marxist conception of legislations (pages 350–360): Alan Hunt
Chapter 23 Deconstruction (pages 361–367): Jack M. Balkin
Chapter 24 legislation and Society (pages 368–380): Brian Z. Tamanaha
Chapter 25 Postmodernism (pages 381–391): Dennis Patterson
Chapter 26 Kantian criminal Philosophy (pages 392–405): Arthur Ripstein
Chapter 27 felony Pragmatism (pages 406–414): Richard Warner
Chapter 28 legislation and Its Normativity (pages 415–445): Roger A. Shiner
Chapter 29 legislations and Literature (pages 446–456): Thomas Morawetz
Chapter 30 the obligation to Obey the legislation (pages 457–466): M. B. E. Smith
Chapter 31 felony Enforcement of Morality (pages 467–478): Kent Greenawalt
Chapter 32 Indeterminacy (pages 479–492): Lawrence B. Solum
Chapter 33 Precedent (pages 493–503): Larry Alexander
Chapter 34 Punishment and accountability (pages 504–512): George P. Fletcher
Chapter 35 Loyalty (pages 513–520): George P. Fletcher
Chapter 36 Coherence (pages 521–538): Ken Kress
Chapter 37 The Welfare country (pages 539–547): Sanford Levinson
Chapter 38 felony Scholarship (pages 548–558): Edward L. Rubin
Chapter 39 Authority of legislation (pages 559–570): Vincent A. Wellman
Chapter forty Analogical Reasoning (pages 571–577): Jefferson White
Chapter forty-one probability (pages 578–589): John Oberdiek
Chapter forty two Regulatory conception (pages 590–606): Matthew D. Adler
Chapter forty three method (pages 607–620): Andrew Halpin
Chapter forty four Overcriminalization (pages 621–631): Douglas Husak
Chapter forty five purpose (pages 632–641): Kimberly Kessler Ferzan
Chapter forty six Coercion (pages 642–653): provide Lamond
Chapter forty seven Unjust Enrichment (pages 654–665): Ernest J. Weinrib
Chapter forty eight the perfect of the guideline of legislation (pages 666–674): Andrei Marmor

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Extra resources for A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory, Second edition

Example text

And further, the measure of damages in a case of breach of that tort duty will be only for the actual detriment caused. By contrast, when contract law enforces the relianceinducing promise, the promisor is deemed to be in breach of his duty just because he has failed to perform as promised. Notification will not, in general, discharge that duty. And the measure of damages will be for the value of the promise, not just the reliance loss. It is not at all evident how a merely evidentiary conception of the role of promising can account for this difference in legal result.

The starting point of Locke’s analysis is that God gave the world to men in common, so that the unilateral introduction of private entitlements is acknowledged from the outset to represent something of a moral problem. How did Locke propose to solve the problem? First, he made it manageable by emphasizing that when private property was invented, there was actually more than enough for everyone to make an appropriation. It was only the invention of money, he said, which led to the introduction of larger individual possessions whereby some came to own a lot and others little or nothing; and he argued – not altogether convincingly – that since money was rooted in human convention, that phase of distribution was governed by justificatory considerations of (what I have called) a Rousseauian kind: “Since Gold and Silver … has its value only from the Consent of Men … it is plain, that Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal Possession of the Earth” (Locke, [1690] 1988, pp.

So, in addition to being reasons for promising, the receipt of benefits and the inducement of reliance represent, as consequences of promising, possible substantive bases of obligation. On Atiyah’s view, then, promises are enforceable only when a benefit has been conferred or when reliance has taken place, and the basis for enforcement is in unjust enrichment or in tort respectively. But if this is so, what role is left for the promise itself to play? Atiyah’s answer was that a promise made to obtain a benefit or to induce reliance can play a “formal” role in shaping the legal consequences attaching to these effects (Atiyah, 1981, pp.

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